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third way beyond the two sides of the criticality vs 
post-criticality debate – which concerns advocating 
either an architecture that takes up a discursively 
articulable oppositional stance to the dominant 
culture and an architecture which sees no point in 
criticising economic or political power structures 
and instead tries to find ‘adaptive syntheses’ of the 
multiple dynamic forces and contingencies that it 
inevitably confronts.3 
Pragmatism in this businessman’s sense indi-
cates a way beyond this debate only in so far as 
it alleviates two anxieties Saunders identifies 
with post-criticality: 1) in the reaction against the 
over-intellectualised criticality of the 1990s there 
is a danger of going too far in the opposite direc-
tion of anti-intellectualism, an understandable but 
self-defeating over-reaction to a period of pseudo-
intellectual abstraction; and 2) there is the danger 
of a mindless post-modern acquiescence in the 
political and economic status quo, the fear of an 
architecture too complacent and spineless in its 
ethical and political withdrawal to take a stand on 
controversial issues within the wider culture.
We might characterise the contemporary archi-
tectural scene by saying that architecture schools 
are slowly emerging from a period of philosoph-
ical vampirism, according to which they suffered 
from a powerful need to use philosophies of all 
kinds – perhaps especially fashionable continental 
philosophies – matched by an equally powerful 
disappointment, an incapacity to find any real or 
The official title of this volume is Analytic Philosophy 
and Architecture but the editors also encouraged 
contributions concerning the philosophical tradi-
tion of pragmatism, which is stationed outside the 
opposing encampments of analytic and continental 
philosophy.1 I shall take up this invitation in the 
present essay to contribute to the topic ‘Pragmatist 
Philosophy and Architecture’. What pragmatism is, 
or how we should understand it in the context of 
architecture, will emerge as we proceed. 
The specific motivation for this essay is the 
appearance of two books in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century which both invoke the name 
of ‘pragmatism’ in expressing the hope for a new 
beginning in the theory and practice of architecture: 
William S. Saunders (ed.) The New Architectural 
Pragmatism (2007); and Joan Ockman (ed.) The 
Pragmatist Imagination (2000).2 In both of these 
collections the name of pragmatism is associated 
with bringing the theory and practice, or the abstrac-
tions and the realities, of architecture into some new 
more intimate alignment. 
Nonetheless, at first glance, Saunders and 
Ockman mean quite different things by the term 
‘pragmatism’. Saunders advocates a ‘pragmatic’ 
stance in the familiar businessman’s sense that 
one might associate with America’s famous ‘can 
do!’ attitude. The OED defines it thus: ‘dealing with 
things sensibly and realistically in a way that is 
based on practical rather than theoretical consid-
erations.’ Pragmatism is supposed to indicate a 
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issue in ‘any particular political position’? Does a 
pragmatist aesthetics focusing on lived experience 
recommend ‘any particular approach to architecture 
and urban design’? Does a pragmatist approach 
to the public sphere – one that treats the relation 
between individual and society as reciprocal and 
organic – involve ‘a commitment to particular under-
standings of public space, place and scale’?6 
A general suspicion of pragmatism, despite its 
apparent celebration, is further signaled by the 
absence in either volume of any contribution or 
critical discussion of the work of Richard Sennett, 
an important sociologist and urban theorist who 
explicitly endorses a pragmatist outlook.7 His defini-
tion of pragmatism, geared to his research work on 
modern cities and societies, is of particular interest 
in the present context: 
[the pragmatist] movement has dedicated itself to 
making philosophical sense of concrete experience 
[…] From its origins pragmatism addressed the quality 
of experience as well as sheer facts on the ground […] 
Its animating impulse remains to engage with ordinary, 
plural, constructive human activities.8
Let us take this as the core component of a working 
definition for present purposes, one that stresses a 
multi-dimensional notion of experience, a complex, 
contingent and uncertain reality and first-hand 
engagement in human practices (echoing Marx’s 
praxis but without the Hegelian baggage of an 
absolute reason). 
Curiously, Sennett neglects to mention that the 
ethos of craftsmanship is at the heart of pragma-
tism’s democratic experimentalist epistemology. 
We craft our system of beliefs: adjusting them to fit 
new facts and experiences whilst retaining as many 
as possible in the process. Epistemology is here 
re-imagined as a fallible anti-authoritarian theory of 
collective inquiry based on empirical experimenta-
tion animated by democratic ideals of equal respect, 
lasting satisfaction in any given philosophy; or, at 
least, not the satisfaction originally craved. But for 
each philosophy rejected another philosophy was 
adopted and the cycle continued. That Saunders 
uses the word ‘pragmatism’ without explicitly 
invoking the philosophical tradition that goes by 
that very name is too noticeable to avoid comment. 
What it expresses, I take it, is an understandable 
suspicion of philosophy in the wake of this period of 
vampirism, as if it is unclear what good any philos-
ophy, could do for architecture. As we will see, this 
suspicion of philosophy is a theme of both books. 
But disappointment in philosophy is the flip-side of 
overblown ambitions for it. 
Joan Ockman’s collection contrasts with the 
Saunders collection in explicitly invoking the clas-
sical American pragmatist tradition of Charles 
Peirce, William James and John Dewey. But a 
weakness of her collection is that it allows authors 
to define pragmatism in very different ways without 
attempting to say why they belong to the same 
general outlook. Ockman diagnoses the malady of 
contemporary architecture as ‘the widely acknowl-
edged schism existing between the theory and 
practice of architecture today.’4 It is no surprise, 
then, that pragmatism might seem to offer some 
hope for a new beginning.5 One of its central themes 
is the attempt to overcome the theory/practice 
dichotomy – that is, a fixed metaphysical dualism 
about the nature of things . As we will see, that has 
led many to the misguided view that pragmatism 
solves our practical or professional problems.
In the concluding Afterword the American histo-
rian Casey Blake adopts a suspicious attitude 
towards the suggestion that pragmatism might have 
any significant bearing upon architecture: ‘What, if 
anything, [does] the pragmatist imagination [have] 
to offer the discussions of architecture, design, 
urban space, and political change at this turn-of-
the-century moment?’ More specific questions 
follow: Does pragmatist epistemology-as-inquiry 
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‘intellectual temperament’ which includes personal 
taste and sensibility, as well as one’s imagination 
and passions.10 Pragmatism is the last philosophy to 
think that open, informed and serious thinking about 
a difficult problem in architecture or anything else 
must lead all who engage in it to a single agreed-
upon conclusion. 
Pragmatism is a form of anti-dogmatism that 
celebrates an open plurality of specific methods, 
perspectives and attitudes to the world. It aims to ‘let 
many flowers bloom’ in philosophy by not claiming 
any special authority or a priori access to the truth, 
over and above experience, as Dewey explains:
[Philosophy’s] primary concern is to clarify, liberate, 
and extend the goods which inhere in the naturally 
generated functions of experience. It has no call to 
create a world of “reality” de novo, nor to delve into 
secrets of Being hidden from common sense and 
science. It has no stock of information or body of 
knowledge peculiarly its own; if it does not always 
become ridiculous when it sets up as a rival of 
science, it is only because a particular philosopher 
happens to be also, as a human being, a prophetic 
man of science. Its business is to accept and to utilize 
for a purpose the best available knowledge of its own 
time and place. And this purpose is criticism of beliefs, 
institutions, customs, policies with respect to their 
bearing upon good. This does not mean their bearing 
upon the good, as something itself formulated and 
attained within philosophy. For as philosophy has no 
private store of knowledge or of methods for attaining 
truth, so it has no private access to good. As it accepts 
knowledge of facts and principles from those compe-
tent in science and inquiry, it accepts the goods that 
are diffused in human experience. It has no Mosaic 
or Pauline authority of revelation entrusted to it. But it 
has the authority of intelligence, of criticism of these 
common and natural goods.11
These words are best read against the background 
of a certain conception of the role or function of 
openness to criticism without fear or favour, and 
toleration of alternative approaches and dissenting 
opinions. The guiding principle is that everything, 
including the method itself, is put to the test of expe-
rience, including the experiences of others.9 
On suspicion of (pragmatist) philosophy 
As we have seen, Blake asks whether pragmatism 
yields any particular positions or understandings in 
the realm of architecture. He doubts whether it does 
and whether a pragmatist revival would have any 
‘immediate political payoff’. But it is worth asking 
whether the fault lies more with the questions he 
expects pragmatism to answer than with pragma-
tism itself.
 Blake condemns pragmatism for what it cannot 
do because he is too sure he knows what it hopes or 
aspires to do. I want to question his implicit concep-
tion of its aspirations. For why should we expect 
or hope pragmatism – or indeed any philosophical 
outlook – to have specific architectural or political 
payoffs? We must ask, what is the relation between 
pragmatism and the questions of special concern to 
architecture (at least in advanced Western countries 
in the early twenty-first century) that Blake poses? 
 In the broadest terms, philosophy is reason’s 
reflection on itself, a study of the nature and scope 
of reason; but also a study of its limits. If philosophy 
inevitably tends towards rationalism then pragma-
tism is a counter to that dominant tendency – a 
form of empiricism, a movement calling for a return 
to experience that arises time and again in the 
history of philosophy as a dialectical and skeptical 
reaction to rationalism. Pragmatism, like empiri-
cism generally, calls attention to the depth and 
variety of human experience as well as the limits 
of argument. It is most assuredly not a philosophy 
that puts all its stock in reason, for all its undeniable 
importance. As William James argues, the impact 
of reason or the power of an argument to change 
one’s mind depends upon what he calls one’s 
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experimental and critical methods of investigation. 
Here ‘scientific’ connotes anti-authoritarianism, a 
fallible trial and error experimentalism and open-
ness to criticism. Call this manner of philosophy 
philosophy-as-method. I suggest we see pragma-
tism in this second way, as a method of approach, 
or, let us say, an orientation in thinking and acting as 
opposed to a set of doctrines.13 
The great benefit of looking at pragmatism as 
method rather than doctrine is that it leaves one 
free to believe what one likes – that is, so long as 
one is responsible to the initiating question and the 
facts of the situation and all the relevant consid-
erations that bear on them. Indeed pragmatism’s 
theme is freedom for the main task is to give one 
techniques or suggestions for how to free oneself 
from perennial confusions, obstacles, and preju-
dices, which continually threaten to undermine or 
block clear unbiased reflection.14 The names of 
these philosophical threats are familiar: dogmatism; 
authoritarianism; foundationalism; essentialism 
and transcendent realism. In all cases what is at 
issue is not this or that particular belief or theory 
but our misguided attitudes towards our beliefs and 
theories (e.g., treating them as certain, fixed, and 
timeless) and the explanatory pretensions we foist 
upon them (e.g., that certain beliefs are founda-
tional in our system of beliefs or that they constitute 
an essence which explains all phenomena picked 
out by a certain term or that they ultimately refer to a 
really real world beyond human experience).15 
Pragmatism’s attitude to problem-solving is 
pluralistic and anti-absolutist: we must not assume 
there is a single right answer; but, more than that, 
we must not attempt to relieve ourselves of the 
responsibility to think and decide for ourselves by 
supposing that a ‘theory’ (including pragmatism 
itself) will solve our problems. Pragmatism leaves 
you free to solve the problems that face you; what it 
provides is an orientation, methods, rules-of-thumb, 
philosophy – one that is overlooked or not clearly in 
focus in the two books under discussion. 
We have already briefly considered Sennett’s 
positive characterisation of pragmatism in the 
setting of urban theory, and I shall return to consider 
it further shortly. But in order to better understand 
how we are to take positive characterisations of 
pragmatism including that of Dewey, it is worth 
observing that Richard Rorty, a leading neo-prag-
matist, often characterises pragmatism in negative 
terms: fallibilism (the denial of absolute certainty); 
experimentalism (the denial of unrevisable a priori 
truth); anti-foundationalism; anti-essentialism; 
and opposition to metaphysical realism and its 
correspondence theory of truth.12 There is an impor-
tant insight here. Although such ‘-isms’ look like 
doctrines they are better understood as strategies 
for opposing various constant tendencies of, or atti-
tudes towards, ways of thinking. While Sennett and 
Dewey put a positive spin on pragmatism, it is, in an 
important sense, a negative discipline, which has 
the important corollary that it leaves the question at 
issue open and so invites one to think and decide 
for oneself how best to respond to it. Let me explain.
Pragmatism is famous for modeling philosophy 
on science (although as we have seen Sennett 
makes a good case for modeling it on craft by 
way of the concept of experience – a model I shall 
return to). But there are two quite different ways of 
understanding the philosophy/science relationship 
here: (1) one might think pragmatism, like science, 
issues in something akin to the products of scientific 
inquiry – namely, beliefs or theories – the thought 
being that all reasonable people should accept 
these cognitive ‘products’ on the grounds that they 
have the right evidential and critical credentials. 
Call this style of philosophy philosophy-as-ideology; 
(2) alternatively, one might think of pragmatism 
as being like science in so far as it is a socially 
informed activity which advocates for certain 
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Problems in any evaluatively rich domain like that 
of architecture, are not solved by abstract ‘theory’ 
(philosophy-as-ideology) but by the application in 
real-world circumstances of what Dewey called 
intelligence, which involves personal taste, choice 
and the capacity for good judgment; as well as 
taking responsibility for the actions that exhibit and 
realise this intelligence. So we must contest Robert 
Somol’s claim ‘that criticism isn’t necessary’.19 Not 
only is criticism (intelligence) necessary, the main 
task of pragmatism-as-method is to make criticism 
better. Intelligence is improved by becoming more 
experimental and more democratic: expanding the 
range of those whose experience bears on one’s 
own inquiries; and being open to wider social circles 
of information, reflection and criticism.  
Pragmatism, as we have seen, is committed to 
pluralism – the idea that there is often no single 
solution to a given problem. But pluralism goes 
deeper than that. There is no one right description 
of a situation, or of a problem, either. That’s a key 
reason why major philosophers such as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch thought that a great 
deal of thinking has already been done in arriving at 
a description of the problem one faces.20 The prac-
tical suggestion for architects is that the more time 
spent on articulating the problem, the less time, 
money and effort one will waste rushing forward to 
consider or, perhaps, realise possible, but what are, 
in retrospect, ill-considered solutions. To describe 
the problem in all its complexity is impossible since 
there is no end to it but to go beyond the current 
norm, according to which description of the problem 
is often taken for granted, will get one closer towards 
a range of better solutions, or, what we might think 
of as working hypotheses.
As Rorty never tires of saying, pragmatism calls 
attention to the need to invent new vocabularies, new 
descriptions, and the new possibilities they make 
available – and this is nowhere more important than 
to avoid some perennial conceptual and explana-
tory pitfalls. That is the point of calling it a negative 
discipline. 
Blake is not alone in supposing that the job of 
philosophy is to offer an ideology which solves 
one’s problems, by delivering specific answers to 
one’s questions. Arguably philosophy-as-ideology 
is accepted by all parties to the criticality vs post-
criticality debate given that it concerns, on the one 
hand, the actual production of critical architecture 
(Michael Hays gives Mies van der Rohe’s work as 
an example) and, on the other, ‘performance or prac-
tice’, the effective production of architectural work.16 
But this conception of philosophy is self-deceptive 
and misleading. There is no theory or set of rules 
that will solve the difficult problems facing architec-
ture today: the overwhelming size and complexity of 
large-scale structures, especially the urban environ-
ment itself (e.g. Koolhaas’s ‘Bigness’); the nostalgia 
for a sense of lost identity as a result of ‘the frag-
mentation of communities’17; confronting how little 
autonomy or control the architect has in dealing with 
large and largely immovable political, economic 
and social forces; the logistical complexities in the 
co-ordination of so many professions and skilled 
workers in the design and manufacture of buildings; 
the disorientation resulting from the digital demateri-
alisation of buildings as new technologies transform 
walls into image-screens and virtual spaces seam-
lessly integrate with physical space; and the threat 
posed by design software and smart apps in the 
design and functioning of buildings.18 It is quixotic 
to suppose that pragmatism or any philosophy or 
theory of architecture could solve such problems all 
at once and once and for all. If pragmatism is to 
help it is by putting one in a better – less confused, 
clearer, more free – position to respond to architec-
ture’s problems intelligently as they arise. 
Here it is most important to distinguish ‘theory’ 
from criticism in the sense of intelligence-in-action. 
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threats, some of which we have canvassed. It is 
a therapeutic reflection whose aim is to prepare 
one to think better about whatever it is one wishes 
to think about, e.g. a scheme for an architectural 
project, an urban transport problem or the design of 
a building detail. As Dewey explains,
If basic problems can be settled only where they arise, 
namely, in the cultural conditions of our associated life; 
if philosophy is fundamentally a criticism which brings 
to light these problems and gives them the clarity that 
springs from definite formulation; and if after formula-
tion philosophy can do no more than point the road 
intelligent action must take, then the greatest service 
any particular philosophical theory can render is to 
sharpen and deepen the sense of these problems.24
Blake, then, is guilty of criticising pragmatism on the 
basis of a misconception about what it can realisti-
cally aim to achieve. His pragmatism is a straw man 
that hopelessly strives, without the requisite knowl-
edge or experience, to be a rival to architectural 
criticism and practice. 
Saunders’s suspicion of pragmatism is better 
motivated. We are invited to ask whether philosophy 
is part of the problem – say, a form of needless and 
abstract hyper-intellectualism extraneous to archi-
tecture’s genuine concerns – or part of the solution, 
precisely the kind of ‘self-reflective thoughtfulness’ 
and responsiveness in design that architecture 
needs?25 Two things are worth noting here. One is 
that pragmatism is well aware of, and attempts to 
avoid, the disturbing tendency of academic philos-
ophy to devolve into unenlightening scholasticism. 
Secondly, it is curious that the favoured terms of 
the new approach Saunders considers all seem to 
be borrowed from the pragmatist tradition: ‘efficacy, 
innovation, and realism’; ‘a healthy resistance to 
predetermining fixed ideas’; and ‘experimentation’.26 
And the same goes for several other contributions 
to his volume. Consider, for example, Somol and 
Whiting’s manifesto for post-criticality where we 
in the description of the typically inchoate problem-
atic situation one is facing.21 This gives pragmatism 
a freedom and flexibility completely absent from the 
metaphysical tradition; as well as a route to liberate 
oneself from the everyday metaphysics (e.g. essen-
tialism, supernaturalism) we tend to unreflectively 
engage in.22 
Pragmatism is not wedded to its solutions but 
always keeps a skeptical eye on them to make 
sure they are working, pulling their weight. This is 
an aspect of its science-inspired fallibilism. Indeed, 
for a pragmatist a solution – perhaps a building, 
a designed landscape or a plan for urban devel-
opment – is a working hypothesis to be tested by 
(further) experience. Architects are in the awkward 
position of building their hypotheses. If they do not 
work it is not so easy to live with or to replace with a 
better hypothesis. What we need, then, is to change 
our attitude to misfires, mistakes and failures – to 
see them as fruitful steps we can learn from on the 
way to a better tomorrow. For example, a pragmatist 
strategy for architects might be to rethink the idea 
that a building is ever completed. Instead of thinking 
in the fixed terms of problem/solution we might see a 
project as always, in fact, a work-in-progress – able 
to be altered or refashioned in various ways if we 
come to see that as the better working hypothesis 
for the new conditions. The Sydney Opera House 
provides a good example of this new conception in 
action.23
Pragmatism is not, then, a quasi-scientific theory 
designed to answer architectural or urban prob-
lems that philosophers obviously do not have the 
training or expertise to solve. It is not a problem-
solving method that provides ready-made solutions 
to problems of whatever sort one chooses: psycho-
logical, economic, political, architectural, and so 
on. It is better understood as a problem-solving 
method: a method of approach or orientation to 
problem-solving that allows problems to be more 
clearly articulated free from perennial philosophical 
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of Bigness are thus uncertain, both at the level 
of programme and as an effective and affective 
element of an urban environment. The moral for the 
architect is that there is no theory, no science, no 
ethics – in short, no knowledge – that is available 
to the architect to solve his or her problems in the 
new ‘culture of congestion’.29 Koolhaas’s skepticism 
about architectural knowing fits well with the prag-
matist tradition that focuses more on actual practices 
of successful making (craftsmanship) rather than an 
abstract, fixed and universal ‘knowledge’. 
But rather than experience this loss of the 
certainty and stability of knowledge as a tragedy, a 
key feature of Koolhaas’s new polemical vision is 
the frenetic enthusiasm with which he expunges the 
dream of certainty, knowledge and control to revel 
in a new age of experiment and surprise. In episte-
mological terms this might be seen as analogous to 
replacing the Cartesian dream of absolutely certain 
knowledge that inaugurated modern philosophy 
with the fallibilism and experimentalism of prag-
matism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In aesthetic terms it is an argument within 
post-Kantian aesthetics for prioritising sublimity 
over beauty. Koolhaas articulates a new architec-
tural sublime, which finds a delirious pleasure in 
the incomprehensible ‘bigness’ of New York’s urban 
environment – which, from the perspective of tradi-
tional architecture, is terrifying for the very same 
reason.30 
Of particular importance for our purposes is 
Koolhaas’s sense that one must destroy once 
and for all the nostalgic idea of an architecture 
that presumes to offer ideological opposition to 
the economic and political realities of capitalism. 
Koolhaas sees architecture and urbanism as 
inevitably having to accommodate themselves to 
contemporary economic and political forces. Its 
message to architects is that they are not to work 
nostalgically and hopelessly against capitalism but 
to fully develop whatever new possibilities there are 
find the following pragmatist terms being valorised: 
‘projection’, ‘performativity’, ‘pragmatics’, ‘contin-
gencies’, ‘practice’. 
The philosophy of pragmatism haunts Saunders’s 
volume, unnamed. My proposal is that if we consider 
philosophy as orientation rather than ideology, 
then there is no need for skeptical reticence about 
invoking pragmatist philosophy in an architectural 
context. 
Pragmatism and criticism: the case of Rem 
Koolhaas
Let us now reconsider, from a pragmatist perspec-
tive, the criticality vs post-criticality debate, which 
sets the stage for both Saunders’s and Ockman’s 
collections. Rem Koolhaas seems a fitting target 
for this discussion given his preeminent status as 
an architectural critic, star architect and champion 
of the new post-critical movement. It is also worth 
remarking that he embraces several pragmatist 
themes himself without ever calling himself a prag-
matist. Koolhaas’s ‘pragmatism’ makes it especially 
interesting in the context of the present discussion 
to re-examine the surprising and unsettling claim 
that the architecture he recommends is uncritical or 
‘post-critical’. 
Delirious New York (1978), Rem Koolhaas’s 
retroactive manifesto for Manhattan, and the later 
S,M,L,XL (1995), can both be read as expressing 
a pragmatist vision of architecture.27 The architec-
tural condition Koolhaas calls Manhattanism, which 
is further elaborated in his ‘theory of Bigness’, is 
articulated in terms of the key pragmatist ideas 
of uncertainty, contingency, experimental social 
arrangements and the condition of not-knowing or, 
put otherwise, our need to make things up as we 
go along. Koolhaas argues that the new scale of 
architecture in modern mega-cities renders large-
scale architecture and urban design uncontrollable. 
Consequently, old ‘issues of composition, scale, 
proportion, detail are now moot’.28 The effects 
112
not as something fixed once and for all but, like any 
other dynamic social or political structures, capable 
of change, evolution and improvement. 
Capitalism is an umbrella term standing for a 
range of different possible systems of private prop-
erty, corporate capitalism being only one. And even 
contemporary corporate capitalism is not homoge-
neous but manifests a multiplicity of heterogenous 
forces. One can expose and criticise the wrongs 
and disvalues of capitalism in order to help alleviate 
social injustices and inequalities and to better realise 
actual and latent goods in the present situation. 
Here, skepticism of the temptations of metaphysical 
thinking (in this case, monism and absolutism) plays 
an indispensable role in making available the option 
of criticising capitalist society from within in order 
to overcome its shortcomings and to manifest its 
goods. The work of pragmatism in this context is to 
clarify, criticise and overcome wrongs and to clarify, 
liberate and extend goods within capitalist society. 
‘Everything we do and say is critical’, Koolhaas 
has remarked, ‘but architecture itself can’t be critical 
of anything’.33 Despite acknowledging the ubiquity of 
criticism, Koolhaas hopelessly attempts to quaran-
tine architecture into a distinct realm of uncriticality 
by way of the artificial distinction of architecture and 
architect, product and producer. Apparently, this is 
the only way he can find to express a pragmatist 
desire for architecture to be understood in relation 
to actual (as opposed to merely imagined or ideal-
ised) circumstances; and to oppose an old image 
of mythical power and control for a new image of 
experimental intervention, however modest or 
limited, within an environment of largely uncontrol-
lable social, economic and political forces. 
To return architecture to the realm of praxis 
Koolhaas is fully justified in rejecting intellectual 
positions that recommend disengagement from 
current economic and political conditions and that 
consequently lack any genuine efficacy. But an 
for the creation of ‘territories with potential’, and 
of ‘enabling fields that accommodate… [indefinite] 
form[s]’, ‘discovering unnameable hybrids’, and 
‘endless intensifications and diversifications’ within 
the existing conditions of contemporary society. On 
this basis Koolhaas concludes that ‘[architects and 
urbanists] have to dare to be utterly uncritical’.31 
As I read him Koolhaas has here fallen into the 
fallacy of oppositional thinking that has come to 
typify the criticality vs post-criticality debate. Since 
he wants to challenge the wholesale rejection of 
capitalism in the critical traditions inspired by Marx 
he finds himself denying the relevance of criticism 
for architecture in general. Criticality has to be 
opposed by an equally totalising uncriticality. Hence 
the term that is used to describe his stance: post-
criticality. But why this extremism? 
There is no inconsistency in thinking that while 
architecture must make ‘strategic realignments’ 
and adopt ‘compromised positions’ in its relation 
to capitalist power it can, indeed must, remain crit-
ical – even if not in the starkly oppositional sense 
that Koolhaas means to reject.32 Pragmatism allows 
us to see why. When Dewey speaks of ‘[philoso-
phy’s] primary concern […] to clarify, liberate, and 
extend the goods which inhere in the naturally gener-
ated functions of experience’ it should be noted that 
he means to include the goods that inhere in our 
experience of globalised corporate capitalism and 
of flawed democracies as represented by, paradig-
matically, the USA. 
The pragmatist outlook rejects any overarching 
Hegelian story about reason-in-history or any 
universalist conception of the good that sees capi-
talism as inherently and unalterably alienating or 
as an irrevocable social pathology. Absolutism and 
universalism are familiar examples of rationalistic 
metaphysical thinking that pragmatism works hard 
to oppose. Only when they are cleared away can 
we free ourselves to see capitalism and democracy 
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It has to be admitted, however, that Hays 
muddies the waters by employing the term ‘oppo-
sitional’ to characterise criticality.35 This makes the 
difference between his position and that of Somol 
and Whiting appear starker than it might be. The 
important point is that a critical architecture need 
not be an oppositional architecture. Indeed one of 
the primary functions of criticism is to propose new 
solutions to problems by recommending ‘alterna-
tive (not necessarily oppositional) arrangements 
and scenarios’, as Somol and Whiting usefully put 
it.36 Effective melioristic interventions into what is, 
inevitably, a dynamic social system do not require 
a radical opposition or overthrow of existing institu-
tions or power structures.37
Koolhaas and his post-critical followers are right 
that neo-Marxist hopes of a revolutionary architec-
ture (more extreme in its opposition to the status 
quo than anything Hays envisioned) is mere wishful 
thinking rather than productive engagement in the 
built environment and the complex web of forces 
that meet there. Richard Rorty sums up the prag-
matist attitude towards neo-Marxism and other 
revolutionary ‘solutions’ to the problems of corpo-
rate capitalism by remarking, ‘there is no science of 
history, nor any big discovery (by Marx or anyone 
else) of the one right, proper, adequate, context in 
which to place unemployment, mafias, merchants 
of death, globalized labour markets and the rest.’38 
But the alternative to the oppositional model is not 
acquiescence in a passive post-critical malaise. 
What we need is a new model for ‘a practice [that] 
would find material for experimentation, critique, 
and theoretical speculation in the methods and 
procedures of day-to-day architectural practice’, as 
Stan Allen articulates it.39 Where is such a model to 
be found? 
The architect and the ethos of craft
One promising proposal is to see architecture as 
a craft as Sennett articulates it in The Craftsman 
(2008). Sennett argues for a conception of craft 
architecture that works within the conditions that it 
cannot avoid need not be uncritical, as Koolhaas 
and the champions of post-criticality influenced by 
him suppose. Post-criticality is a myth. It is really 
a criticism of a certain style of criticism mislabelled 
as post-criticism. What needs clarification, however, 
is the way a work of architecture can be critical 
since it clearly cannot model itself on discursive 
revolutionary criticism of which Marx’s Communist 
Manifesto is perhaps the most famous example.
I suggest we reread the criticality vs post-criti-
cality debate as not really about the possibility of 
a critical architecture but about the form criticism 
takes in the contemporary situation where the archi-
tect is confronted by the problems of not-knowing, 
minimal autonomy and yet, in spite of everything, 
the desire to create. This is really a question about 
architectural agency: how can an architect have a 
voice in the production of buildings, landscapes, 
urban plans and so forth, where the relevant infor-
mation to take account of is overwhelming in range 
and complexity and one is working alongside other 
professions (engineers, builders, joiners, interior 
designers, project managers, landscape designers 
etc.) under economic and political conditions over 
which there is little, if any, control? 
Michael Hays, a leading defender of criticality, 
has convincingly argued that we must locate the 
architectural agent somewhere in the conceptual 
space between the extremes of autonomous crea-
tion of form and agential nihilism – the fanciful 
notion that an architect is a mere ‘cog’ in a vast 
cultural mechanism. Although they differ in matters 
of sensibility, style and emphasis, it is hard to see 
how Somol and Whiting – leading proponents of 
post-criticality – could disagree with this charac-
terisation. Surely they do not advocate the ‘death 
of the architect’ or, if they do, that has about as little 
plausibility as the ‘death of the author’ of French 
structuralist literary criticism.34
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although for certain purposes we might be able 
to draw a conceptual distinction between certain 
facts (e.g. urban population densities, the circula-
tion patterns of a building) and certain values (e.g. 
beauty, justice, equality of opportunity), there is no 
hard and fast and universal fact/value duality written 
into the nature of things.45
Contemporary architecture is wedded to a genius 
(or ‘star’) model of production that stresses indi-
vidual creativity, the ruthlessness of rankings and 
the impossibility of explaining the creative process. 
The mystery of creation is precisely what the term 
‘genius’ is used to connote; as well as the complete-
ness of the finished ‘work’ – not just a solution but 
the solution. The craft model, alternatively, stresses 
the value of cooperative endeavor, shared experi-
ence and collective trial and error; as well as the 
adaptability of the ‘work’ over time.46
Architecture has a unique and curious position 
in the history of aesthetics since it is for many, an 
oxymoron: an art and a craft! Much has been written 
about the intense paradoxicality of this condi-
tion – the clash between the Kantian idea of art as 
a ‘useless’ object of disinterested contemplation 
and architectural functionality, being a useful object 
of human habitation.47 But, note, this problem only 
arises if we accept the post-romantic idea that there 
is an exclusive ontological distinction between art-
objects and craft-objects. 
Pragmatism usefully clarifies the conceptual 
landscape here by making clear that the distinction 
between art and craft is really a distinction at the 
level of conception. To think of it as an ontological 
distinction leads to the traditional confusion about 
the status of architecture we have just considered.48 
But there is nothing untoward about the very same 
object – a building, say – qualifying as art and as 
craft in so far as it fulfills the different aesthetic and 
social functions that each of these terms desig-
nate: say, that art feels like it makes the kind of 
that transcends the instrumental, its value not 
being exhausted in satisfying some pre-determined 
function. The book’s guiding idea is that making 
is thinking. Indeed we could expand this formula 
to say, making is thinking and valuing, according 
to which the product made inevitably expresses 
certain thoughts and values.40 
The question how a profession like architecture 
(or science or business…) can be ethically or politi-
cally engaged can seem more difficult to answer 
than it is when asked against the background of 
an assumed fact/value dichotomy – another meta-
physical obstacle to clear thinking. But, as James 
and Dewey convincingly argued, facts presuppose 
values of all kinds (e.g. cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, 
political).41 As Sennett remarks, regarding the ethos 
of craft, ‘Pragmatism wants to emphasize the value 
of asking ethical questions during the work process; 
it contests after-the-fact ethics, ethical enquiry 
beginning only after facts on the ground are fixed.’42 
The same goes for cognitive, political, aesthetic or 
religious values. Max Weber’s misconception of 
science as a value-free activity has had an unde-
served influence on the culture because it simply 
overlooks the obvious fact that science itself is a 
value-laden activity, whose importance depends on 
realising the value of objectivity, not to mention the 
democratic values involved in collective scientific 
inquiry.43 As Charles Peirce, the original instigator 
of pragmatism, was one of the first to see, scien-
tific inquiry – our paradigm of discovering facts – is 
a collaborative social activity that depends on insti-
tuting democratic values of open communication, 
freedom from dictatorial authorities, equal respect 
for others and toleration of criticism.44
Overcoming the fact/value dichotomy is only one 
example of a pragmatist method Sennett invokes 
to good effect: that is, the method of rejecting fixed 
metaphysical dualisms, and putting in their place, 
as required, flexible occasion-sensitive distinctions. 
From a pragmatist perspective, we can allow that 
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work in the project – its full circumstances.51 Such 
awareness is a precondition for the potent critical 
act of description of the problem, which is the funda-
mental starting point of any project or proposal; 2) 
particularity of the problem – like a craftsman, an 
architect should regard the problem that confronts 
him or her at a certain time and place as unique, 
taking account of a very particular and complex 
web of conditions and relationships. This is part 
of the reason that there is no ready-made (rule-
governed, formula-driven, computational) solution 
to an architectural problem. Like a craftsman, an 
architect must put trust in her past experience and 
the set of embodied skills that grow out of it, and 
the good judgment one acquires to deal creatively 
with the problem at hand – including, of course, 
good judgment about the use of technology in 
the design process; 3) improvisation – since the 
problem is unique (to some extent at least) there 
is inevitably a degree of improvisation required. 
And in improvising one leaves something of oneself 
(not necessarily something personal) in inanimate 
things. 4) quality – good work is always critical.52 
Learning to discern good work is fundamental since 
good craftsmanship (in the widest sense) manifests 
intelligence, the skillful negotiation of many factors 
and conditions in the creation of something impres-
sive, noble, or beautiful that did not exist before. 
I have distinguished philosophical theories/
ideologies from criticism in the sense of experi-
mental intelligence, something that we can all be 
credited with but which, at the same time, can be 
improved upon through pragmatist methodology 
and heuristics. As the literary critic William Hazlitt 
said, ‘We are nothing if not critical’.53 From the prag-
matist perspective all action, even habitual action, 
is permeated by criticism  – though an agent need 
not be (fully) aware of that; and it may not be, often 
will not be, criticism at its best.54 So when Saunders 
says: ‘The central question is whether architects 
who in their work try to resist and criticize the norms 
of the general contemporary culture/society are 
sense that demands articulation but, somehow, 
it makes more sense than we can put into words; 
whereas craft involves the skillful making of things 
which, at a minimum, satisfy certain predetermined 
ends.49 Both have expressive powers, so there is 
no conceptual obstacle to the idea that architecture 
expresses thoughts and values (e.g. of the architect 
as artist or craftsman, or of a tradition or culture). Of 
course, like any other expressive medium, its power 
to communicate particular thoughts and values 
depends upon how critically attuned and sensitively 
appreciative its audience or users are.
As Sennett argues, pragmatism encourages us 
to think of ‘experience as a craft’, one that turns 
subjective feelings into objective (in this case 
meaning inter-subjective) values as one learns to 
skillfully master the impersonal standards of good 
craftsmanship.50 Experience is a key term in prag-
matist philosophy. The pragmatist treats experience 
itself as a site of work: one needs to learn which of 
one’s hunches to trust – or, to use other metaphors, 
to develop an eye, ear, or nose for the valuable 
features of things – returning to re-experience 
persons, places, objects or relationships that excite 
our interest, however fleeting or inchoate, in order to 
better appreciate the ideas or values they express 
or excite. Learning to attend to the differences or 
discriminations that matter to us – which is, inci-
dentally, what the eighteenth century aesthetic term 
‘taste’ is all about – is a requirement for being able 
to clearly articulate these experiences, to make 
them communicable. In other words, one has to 
learn to learn from experience, including the experi-
ence of others.
There are four aspects to this process of 
learning to learn from experience that are of 
particular relevance to the practice of architec-
ture: 1) alert receptivity – without the imaginary 
(fixed? a priori?) knowledge of theory, the archi-
tect must be attentively receptive to the multiple 
and dynamic demands, forces and constraints at 
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patient effort of intelligence applied to the particular 
problem at hand in all its experienced complexity 
and conditionedness and temporality – architec-
ture in its mode of craft – tends to be overlooked. 
In this circumstance pragmatism can help to make 
the architect’s implicit intelligence explicit, to make 
it more experimental, more democratic, and more 
articulate. And in the context of Sennett’s articu-
lation of a craft ethos for contemporary society, 
pragmatism can work to enliven our sense of the 
value of intelligence (i.e. criticism in the best sense). 
Let me conclude by noting that when the greatest 
philosopher of the twentieth century, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, wanted a symbol to stand for a body 
of careful critical thinking he employed an image of 
architecture as craft,
In the elder days of art,
Builders wrought with greatest care
Each minute and unseen part,
For the gods are everywhere.57
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